Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning for Stable Equilibrium in Competitive-Cooperative Decision Systems

Authors

  • Michael J. Smith Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 2E4, Canada Author
  • Daniel Nguyen Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 2E4, Canada Author
  • Sarah Thompson Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 2E4, Canada Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.71465/fias777

Keywords:

Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Multi-agent reinforcement learning, Actor-critic, Stability

Abstract

Collaborative systems often involve both cooperative and competitive interactions, making equilibrium stability a key challenge. This study develops a game-theoretic reinforcement learning framework that integrates Nash equilibrium constraints into policy optimization. A multi-agent actor-critic model is augmented with equilibrium regularization to guide agents toward stable joint strategies. Evaluation is conducted on 8,600 mixed-motive tasks, including bidding, resource sharing, and competitive planning scenarios. The proposed method improves equilibrium convergence rate by 31.5% and reduces oscillatory behaviour in policies by 27.9% compared to standard multi-agent RL approaches. Additionally, social welfare metrics increase by 18.6%, indicating better global outcomes. The results highlight the importance of incorporating game-theoretic principles into collaborative decision learning.

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Published

2026-04-05